Abstract. We construct new non-associative key establishment protocols for all left self-distributive (LD), multi-LD-, and mutual LD-systems. The hardness of these protocols relies on variations of the (simultaneous) iterated LDproblem and its generalizations. We discuss instantiations of these protocols using generalized shifted conjugacy in braid groups and their quotients, LDconjugacy and f -symmetric conjugacy in groups. We suggest parameter choices for instantiations in braid groups, symmetric groups and several matrix groups.
Introduction
In an effort to construct new key establishment protocols (KEPs), which are hopefully harder to break than previously proposed non-commutative schemes, the first author introduced in his PhD thesis [Ka07] (see also [Ka12] ) the first nonassociative generalization of the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld KEP [AAG99] , which revolutionized the field of non-commutative public key cryptography (PKC) more than ten years ago. For an introduction to non-commutative public key cryptography we refer to the book by Myasnikov et al. [MSU11] . For further motivation and on non-associative PKC we refer to [Ka12] . It turns out (see [Ka12] ) that in the context of AAG-like KEPs for magmas, left self-distributive systems (LDsystems) and their generalizations (like multi-LD-systems) naturally occur. A construction that provides KEPs for all LD-, multi-LD-and mutually left distributive systems was presented in [KT13] . With this method at hand any LDor multi-LD-system automatically provides a KEP, and we obtain a rich variety of new non-associatiave KEPs coming from LD-, multi-LD-, and other left distributive systems. Here, we propose somehow improved, iterated versions of the KEPs from [KT13] . Definition 2.3. A mutual left distributive system (S, * a , * b ) is a set S equipped with two binary operations * a , * b on S such that x * a (y * b z) = (x * a y) * b (x * a z) x * b (y * a z) = (x * b y) * a (x * b z) for all x, y, z ∈ S.
A mutual left distributive system (L, * a , * b ) is only a partial bi-LD-system. The left selfdistributivity laws need not hold, i.e., (L, * a ) and (L, * b ) are in general no LD-systems.
Examples.
We list examples of LD-systems, multi-LD-systems and mutual left distributive systems. More details can be found in [De00, De06, Ka12, KT13].
2.2.1. Trivial example. (S, * ) with x * y = f (y) is an LD-system for any function f : S → S.
Free LD-systems.
A set S with a binary operation * , that satisfies no other relations than those resulting from the left self-distributivity law, is a free LDsystem. Free LD-systems are studied extensively in [De00] .
Conjugacy.
A classical example of an LD-system is (G, * ) where G is a group equipped with the conjugacy operation x * y = x −1 yx (or x * rev y = xyx −1 ). Note that such an LD-system cannot be free, because conjugacy satisfies additionally the idempotency law x * x = x.
Laver tables.
Finite groups equipped with the conjugacy operation are not the only finite LD-systems. Indeed, the socalled Laver tables provide the classical example for finite LD-systems. There exists for each n ∈ N an unique LD-system L n = ({1, 2, . . . , 2 n }, * ) with k * 1 = k + 1. The values for k * l with l = 1 can be computed by induction using the left self-distributive law. The Laver tables for n = 1, 2, 3 are L 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 L 2 1 2 3 4 1 2 4 2 4 2 3 4 3 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 1 2 3 4 L 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 4 6 8 2 4 6 8 2 3 4 7 8 3 4 7 8 3 4 8 4 8 4 8 4 8 4 5 6 7 8 5 6 7 8 5 6 8 6 8 6 8 6 8 6 7 8 7 8 7 8 7 8 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Laver tables are also described in [De00] .
2.2.5. LD-conjugacy. Let G be a group, and f ∈ End(G). Set x * f y = f (x −1 y)x, then (G, * f ) is an LD-system. We call an ordered pair (u, v) ∈ G × G f -LDconjugated or LD-conjugated, or simply f -conjugated, denoted by u −→ * f v, if there exists a c ∈ G such that v = c * f u = f (c −1 u)c. More general, let f, g, h ∈ End(G). Then the binary operation x * y = f (x −1 ) · g(y) · h(x) yields an LD-structure on G if and only if
(1) f h = f, gh = hg = hf, f g = gf = f 2 , h 2 = h.
See Proposition 2.3 in [KT13] . The simplest solution of the system of equations (1) is f = g and h = id which leads to the definition of LD-conjugacy given above.
2.2.6. Shifted conjugacy. Consider the braid group on infinitely many strands B ∞ = {σ i } i≥1 | σ i σ j = σ j σ i for |i − j| ≥ 2, σ i σ j σ i = σ j σ i σ j for |i − j| = 1 where inside σ i the (i + 1)-th strand crosses over the i-th strand. The shift map ∂ : B ∞ −→ B ∞ defined by σ i → σ i+1 for all i ≥ 1 is an injective endomorphism. Then B ∞ equipped with the shifted conjugacy operations * , * defined by
1 · ∂y · x is a bi-LD-system. In particular, (B ∞ , * ) is an LD-system.
Dehornoy points out, that once the definition of shifted conjugacy is used, braids inevitably appear (see Exercise I.3.20 in [De00] ). Consider a group G, an endomorphism f ∈ End(G), and a fixed element a ∈ G. Then the binary operation x * y = x * f,a y = f (x) −1 ·a·f (y)·x yields an LD-structure on G if and only if [f 2 (x), a] = 1 for all x ∈ G, and a satisfies the relation af (a)a = f (a)af (a) 1 . Hence the subgroup H = {f n (a) | n ∈ N} of G is a homomorphic image of the braid group B ∞ on infinitely many strands, i.e., up to an isomorphism, it is a quotient of B ∞ . In case of a = 1 this subgroup H is trivial and the binary operation * f,1 becomes f -conjugacy.
There exists a straightforward generalization of Exercise I.3.20 in [De00] for multi-LD-systems:
Let I be an index set. Consider a group G, a family of endomorphisms (f i ) i∈I of G, and a set of fixed elements {a i ∈ G | i ∈ I}. Then (G, ( * i ) i∈I ) with
is a multi-LD-system if and only if f i = f j =: f for all i = j,
For a proof see, e.g. Proposition 4.6 in [Ka12] .
2.2.7. Generalized shifted conjugacy in braid groups. In the following we consider generalizations of the shifted conjugacy operations * in B ∞ . We set f = ∂ p for some p ∈ N, and we choose a i ∈ B 2p for all i ∈ I such that
Since a i ∈ B 2p , we have [a i , ∂ 2p (x)] = 1 for all x ∈ B ∞ . Thus the conditions (2) are fulfilled, and x * i y = x∂ p (y)a i ∂ p (x −1 ) defines a multi-LD-structure on B ∞ . For |I| = 1, p = 1 and a = σ 1 , which implies H = B ∞ , we get Dehornoy's original definition of shifted conjugacy * .
It remains to give some natural solutions {a i ∈ B 2p | i ∈ I} of the equation set (3). Let, for n ≥ 2, δ n = σ n−1 · · · σ 2 σ 1 . For p, q ≥ 1, we set Note that, contrary to the conjugacy operation * , for this "symmetric conjugacy" operation •, the corresponding relation −→ • , defined by x −→ • y if and only if there exists a c ∈ G such that y = c • x, is not an equivalence relation. In particular, −→ • is reflexive and symmetric, but not transitive.
2.2.9. f -symmetric conjugacy. One may consider several generalizations of this symmetric conjugacy operation •, as candidates for natural LD-operations in groups. Let G be a group, and f, g, h ∈ End(G). Then the binary operation
yields an LD-structure on G if and only if
For a proof see Proposition 2.13 in [KT13] . Except for f 2 = f = g = h = h 2 , the simplest solutions of the system of equations (4) are f 2 = f = g and h = id, or f = id and g = h = h 2 . Let G be a group, and f ∈ End(G) an endomorphism that is also a projector (
are LD-systems.
We have the following left distributivity results. (i) The binary operations • f,g,h and * f,g,h are distributive over •. In particular * is distributive over •. In short, the following equations hold.
(ii) The operations • f and * f ( * rev f ) are distributive over • g if and only if f = gf = f g.
From (ii) we conclude that (G, • f , • g ) is not a mutual left distributive system for f = g.
3.
Key establishment for all LD-systems 3.1. The protocol. Recall that a magma is a set M equipped with a binary operation, say •, which is possibly non-associative. For our purposes all interesting LD-systems are non-associative. Consider an element y of a magma (M, •) which is an iterated product of other elements in M. Such an element can be described by a planar rooted binary tree T whose k leaves are labelled by these other elements y 1 , . . . , y k ∈ M. We use the notation y = T • (y 1 , . . . , y k ). Here the subscript • tells us that the grafting of subtrees of T corresponds to the operation •.
Consider, for example, the element
The corresponding labelled planar rooted binary tree T is displayed in the following figure. 
It is easy to prove by induction (over the depth of the involved trees) that any magma homomorphism β :
Proposition 3.1. Let (L, * ) be an LD-system. Then, for any element x ∈ L, the left multiplication map φ x : y → x * y defines a magma endomorphism of L.
Proposition 3.2. Let (L, * ) be an LD-system and k ∈ N. Then, for all x 1 , . . . , x k ∈ L, the iterated left multiplication map
Proof. Proof by induction over k.
We are going to describe a KEP that applies to any LD-system (L, * ). There are two public submagmas S A = s 1 , · · · , s m * , S B = t 1 , · · · , t n * of (L, * ), assigned to Alice and Bob. Alice and Bob perform the following protocol steps.
Protocol 1: Key establishment for any LD-system (L, * ).
1: Alice generates her secret key (a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a k A ) ∈ S A × L k A , and Bob chooses his secret key b ∈ S k B B . In particular, Alice's and Bob's secret magma morphisms α and β are given by
and sends them to Bob. Bob computes the vector (β(s j )) 1≤j≤m ∈ L m , and sends it to Alice. 3: Alice, knowing a 0 = T * (r 1 , . . . , r l ) with r i ∈ {s 1 , . . . , s m }, computes from the received message
And Bob, knowing for all
4: Alice computes K A = α(β(a 0 )). Bob gets the shared key by
This protocol is an iterated version of Protocol 1 in [KT13] and an asymmetric modification of the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld protocols for magmas introduced in [Ka07, Ka12] . 
Alice
Bob
3.2. Base problems. In order to break Protocol 1 an attacker has to find the shared key K = K A = K B . A successful attack on Bob's secret key b requires the solution of m-simItLDP (m-simultaneous iterated LD-Problem):
Note that in our context, b comes from a restricted domain, namely S
This might affect distributions when one considers possible attacks. Nevertheless, we use the notion of (simultaneous) iterated LD-Problem for inputs generated by potentially arbitrary b ∈ L k B . Similar remarks affect base problems further in the text.
Even if an attacker finds Bob's original key
(solution to the m-simItLDP above), then she still faces the following problem for all i = 1, . . . , k
Proposition 3.3. Let (L, * ) be an LD-system. We define the generalized msimItLDP for S B ⊆ L as an m-simultaneous iterated LD-Problem with the objective to find k
An oracle that solves the generalized m-simItLDP and * -MSP for S B is sufficient to break key establishment Protocol 1.
Proof. As outlined above, we perform an attack on Bob's private key. The generalized m-simItLDP oracle provides a pseudo-key vector
m. Observe that this implies for any element e
This enables us to compute
Note that here the situation is asymmetric -an attack on Alice's secret key requires the solution of the following problem. n-modsimItLDP (Modified n-simultaneous iterated LD-Problem):
Also here, even if an attacker finds Alice's original key (a 0 , a) or a pseudo-key
Proposition 3.4. Let (L, * ) be an LD-system. We define the generalized nmodsimItLDP for S A ⊆ L as a modified n-simultaneous iterated LD-Problem with the objective to find k
An oracle that solves the generalized n-modsimLDP and * -MSP for S A is sufficient to break key establishment Protocol 1.
Proof. As outlined above, we perform an attack on Alice's private key. The generalized n-modsimItLDP oracle provides a pseudo-key (a
Observe that this implies for any element e B ∈ S B that φ a ′ (e B ) = φ a (e B ) =: α(e B ). In particular, we have
We feed the first component a ′ 0 ∈ S A of this pseudo-key into a * -MSP oracle for S A which returns a treeword T ′ * (r 1 , . . . , r l ) = a ′ 0 (for some l ∈ N and r i ∈ {s j } j≤m ). Now, we compute
Both appproaches described above require the solution of a * -submagma Membership Search Problem. Note that we assumed that the generalized m-simItLDP (resp. n-modsimItLDP) oracle already provides a pseudo-key in the submagma S B (resp. S A ) which we feed to the * -MSP oracle. But to check whether an element lies in some submagma, i.e. the * -submagma Membership Decision Problem, is already undecidable in general.
Fortunately, for the attacker, there are approaches which do not resort to solving the * -MSP.
Recall that we defined the generalized m-simItLDP for S B ⊆ L as an msimultaneous iterated LD-Problem with the objective to find k
Proposition 3.5. A generalized simItLDP oracle is sufficient to break key establishment Protocol 1. More precisely, an oracle that solves the generalized msimItLDP for S B and the n-simItLDP is sufficient to break Protocol 1.
Proof. Here we perform attacks on Alice's and Bob's private keys -though we need only a pseudo-key for the second component a ′ of Alice's key. The n-simItLDP
And the generalized m-simItLDP oracle returns the pseudo-key
. Now, we may compute
Recall that we defined the generalized n-modsimItLDP for S A ⊆ L as an n-simultaneous iterated LD-Problem with the objective to find a a
Proposition 3.6. An oracle that solves the generalized n-modsimItLDP for S A and the m-simItLDP is sufficient to break Protocol 1.
Proof. Also here we perform attacks on Alice's and Bob's private keys. The msimItLDP oracle provides k
And the generalized n-modsimItLDP oracle returns the pseudo-key
Remark 3.7. Note that in the non-associative setting the case m = n = 1 is of particular interest, i.e. we may abandon simultaneity in our base problems since the submagmas generated by one element are still complicated objects. 
Let s 1 , . . . , s m , t 1 , . . . , t n ∈ L be some public elements. We denote
. For example, an element y of S A can be described by a planar rooted binary tree T whose k leaves are labelled by these other elements r 1 , . . . , r k with r i ∈ {s i } i≤m . Here the tree contains further information, namely to each internal vertex we assign a binary operation * i ∈ O A . We use the notation y = T O A (r 1 , . . . , r k ). The subscript O A tells us that the grafting of subtrees of T corresponds to the operation * i ∈ O A . Consider, for example, the element y = ((s 3 * α 2 s 3 ) * α 4 s 1 ) * α 1 (s 2 * α 2 s 1 ). The corresponding labelled planar rooted binary tree T is displayed in the following figure.
Let * α ∈ O A and * β ∈ O B . By induction over the tree depth, it is easy to show that, for all elements e, e 1 , . . . , e l ∈ (L, O A ∪ O B ) and all planar rooted binary trees T with l leaves, the following equations hold. e * α T O B (e 1 , . . . , e l ) = T O B (e * α e 1 , . . . , e * α e l ), (7) e * β T O A (e 1 , . . . , e l ) = T O A (e * β e 1 , . . . , e * β e l ). 
In particular, the following equations hold for all
B , e, e 1 , . . . , e l ∈ L and all planar rooted binary trees T with l leaves.
Now, we are going to describe a KEP that applies to any system (L, O A ∪ O B ) as described above. We have two subsets of public elements {s 1 , · · · , s m } and
Alice and Bob perform the following protocol steps.
and Bob chooses his secret key
, then Alice's and Bob's secret magma morphisms α and β are given by (r 1 , . . . , r l ) with r i ∈ {s 1 , . . . , s m }, computes from the received message
(u j,1 , . . . , u j,l j ) with u j,i ∈ {t 1 , . . . , t n }∀i ≤ l j for some l j ∈ N, computes from his received message for all
4: Alice computes K A = α(β(a 0 )). Bob gets the shared key by Alice Bob
Here the operation vectors o A ∈ O 
Recall that we work in the left distributive system (L,
We define the generalized HomSP for (S A , S B ) as a Homomorphism Search Problem for S A with the objective to find a magma homomorphism Proof. As outlined above, we perform an attack on Bob's private key. The generalized HomSP-oracle for (S A , S B ) provides a k ′ B ∈ N and a pseudo-key homomorphism
). This enables us to compute
On the other hand, an attack on Alice's secret key requires (first)
We define the generalized modHomSP for (S B , S A ) as a modified Homomorphism Search Problem for S B with the objective to find (a
Even if an attacker finds a pseudo-key (a Proof. As outlined above, we perform an attack on Alice's private key. The generalized modHomSP oracle provides a pseudo-key (a
into a O A -MSP oracle for S A which returns a tree-word T
(r 1 , . . . , r l ) = a ′ 0 (for some l ∈ N and r i ∈ {s j } j≤m ). Now, we may compute
Now, we describe approaches to break Protocol 2 which do not resort to solving a submagma-MSP. Proposition 4.4. A generalized HomSP oracle is sufficient to break key establishment Protocol 2. More precisely, an oracle that solves the generalized HomSP for (S A , S B ) and the HomP for S B is sufficient to break KEP 2.
Proof. Here we perform attacks on Alice's and Bob's private keys -though we do not require a pseudo-key for the first component a 0 of Alice's key. The HomSP oracle for
And the generalized HomSP oracle for (S A , S B ) returns the pseudo-key endomorphism
Alternatively, one may choose the following approach.
Proposition 4.5. An oracle that solves the generalized modHomSP for (S B , S A ) and the HomSP for S A is sufficient to break KEP 2.
Proof. Also here we perform attacks on Alice's and Bob's private keys. The HomSP oracle for
And the generalized modHomSP oracle for (S B , S A ) returns the pseudo-key (a
5. Instantiations using shifted conjugacy 5.1. Protocol 1. Consider the infinite braid group (B ∞ , * ) with shifted conjugacy as LD-operation. Then the iterated LD-Problem is a simultaneous iterated shifted conjugacy problem. For m = n = 1 this becomes an iterated shifted conjugacy problem. The shifted conjugacy problem. (see e.g. [De06] ) which was first solved in [KLT09] by a double reduction, first to the subgroup conjugacy problem for B n−1 in B n , then to an instance of the simultaneous conjugacy problem. For the simultaneous conjugacy problem in braid groups we refer to [LL02, KT13] . As the shifted CP, also the iterated shifted CP can be reduced to a subgroup conjugacy problem for B n−1 in B n . Even if we replace shifted conjugacy by generalized shifted conjugacy, then the corresponding iterated LD-problem still reduces to a subgroup conjugacy problem for a standard parabolic subgroup of a braid group. Such problems were first solved in a more general framework, namely for Garside subgroups of Garside groups, in [KLT10] . Though not explicitly stated in [KLT09, KLT10] , the simultaneous shifted conjugacy problem and its analogue for generalized shifted conjugacy may be treated by similar methods as in [KLT09, KLT10] . Though these solutions provide only deterministic algorithms with exponential worst case complexity, they may still affect the security of Protocol 1 if we use such LD-systems in braid groups as platform LD-systems. Moreover, efficient heuristic approaches to the shifted conjugacy problem were developed in [LU08, LU09] . Therefore, one may doubt whether an instantiation of Protocol 1 using (iterated) shifted conjugacy in braid groups provides a secure KEP. Nevertheless, it is still more interesting than the classical AAG-KEP for braid groups, and it might be considered as a first challenge for an possible attacker.
Protocol 2.
Here we propose a natural instantiation of Protocol 2 using generalized shifted conjugacy in braid groups. Consider the following natural partial multi-LD-system (B ∞ , O A ∪ O B ) in braid groups.
Let 1 < q 1 < q 2 < p such that q 1 , p − q 2 ≥ 3. Let any * α ∈ O A be of the form
is a mutual left distributive system according to Proposition 2.4 (d). Note that, if in addition we have [α 1 , α 2 ] = [β 1 , β 2 ] = 1, then (B ∞ , * α , * β ) is a bi-LD-system according to Proposition 2.4 (c). But in general these additional commutativity relations do not hold for our choice of standard parabolic subgroups as domains for α 1 , α 2 , β 1 , β 2 . Note that, if we restrict α 2 , β 2 to ∂ q 1 (B q 2 −q 1 ), then these additional relations are enforced. Anyway, they are not necessary for (B ∞ , * α , * β ) being a mutual left distributive system. In either case, α 2 does not need to commute with β 2 .
Alice and Bob perform the protocol steps of Protocol 2 for the partial multi-LD-system (B ∞ , O A ∪ O B ) as described in section 4.1. The deterministic algorithms from [KLT09, KLT10] do not affect the security of this instantiation of Protocol 2, because the operations are part of the secret.
We provide an explicit formula for the public information (here s ′ i ) depending on s i and Bob's secret keys, namely 
k , we introduce the abreviation
p,p ). We conclude that the Homomorphism Search Problem for S A specifies to the following particular (modified) simultaneous decomposition problem.
Input: Element pairs
for all i = 1, . . . , m. Note that one has also to determine the iteration depth k = k B of Bob's secret homomorphism β (or some pseudo iteration depth k ′ ) as well the bit sequence ǫ ∈ {±1}
k . Since all instance elements live in some B N ⊆ B ∞ for some finite N ∈ N, it is easy to obtain an upper bound for k from N.
Remark 5.1. If we abandon simultaneity, i.e. in the case m = 1, we obtain a (modified) special decomposition problem. In the following section we transform this particular problem to finitely many instances of the subgroup conjugacy coset problem for parabolic subgroups of braid groups.
Conjugacy coset problem.
Definition 5.2. Let H, K be subgroups of a group G. We call the following problem the subgroup conjugacy coset problem (SCCP) for (H, K) in G.
Input: An element pair (x, y) ∈ G 2 such that x G ∩ Hy = ∅. Objective: Find elements h ∈ H and c ∈ K such that cxc −1 = hy.
If K = G then we call this problem the conjugacy coset problem (CCP) for H in G.
This is the search (or witness) version of this problem. The corresponding decision problem is to decide whether the conjugacy class of x and the left Hcoset of y intersect, i.e. whether x G ∩ Hy ? = ∅. Anyway, in our cryptographic context we usually deal with search problems.
It is clear from the definition that the SCCP is harder than the double coset problem (DCP) and the subgroup conjugacy problem (subCP), i.e., an oracle that solves SCCP for any pair (H, K) ≤ G 2 also solves DCP and subCP. Though the CCP and the SCCP are natural group-theoretic problems, they seem to have attracted little attention in combinatorial group theory so far. To our knowledge they have been introduced in [KT13] .
We connect the (modified) special decomposition problem from the previous section to the SCCP.
Proposition 5.3. The (modified) special decomposition problem (for m = 1) from section 5.2 can be solved by solving 2 k instances of the SCCP for some standard parabolic subgroups in braid groups, namely the SCCP for
Proof. For m = 1, we write s = s m and s ′ = s ′ m . Let N ∈ N be sufficiently large such that s ′ ∈ B N . For convenience, we choose a minimal N such that N ≥ (k + 1)p and p | N. As in [KLT09, KT13] we conclude thatb ∈ B N −p and
, and
So, if we solve this SCCP for all ǫ ∈ {±1} k , we obtain a solution to the (modified) special decomposition problem (for m = 1) from section 5.2. Note that
Recall that the algorithms from [KLT09, KLT10] , as well as from [GKLT13] , only solve instances of the subgroup conjugacy problem for parabolic subgroups of braid groups, partially by transformation to the simultaneous conjugacy problem in braid groups [KTTV13] . No deterministic or even heuristic solution to the SCCP for (standard) parabolic subgroups in braid groups is known yet.
Open problem. Find a solution to the SCCP, or even the CCP, for (standard) parabolic subgroups in the braid group B N .
The attacker might try to approach first an apparently much easier (but still open) problem, namely the SCCP, or even the CCP, for (standard) parabolic subgroups in the symmetric group S N , which is a natural qoutient of B N , given by the homomorphism σ i → (i, i + 1).
The CCP (and the SCCP) appear to be inherently quadratic, i.e. we do not see how it may be linearized such that linear algebra attacks as the linear centralizer attack of B. Tsaban [Ts12] apply. It shares this feature with Y. Kurt's Triple Decomposition Problem (see section 4.2.5. in [MSU11] ). Note that k is still unknown to the attacker, but N (even N/p) is surely an upper bound for k. Anyway, it suffices to solve O(2 N ) SCCP-instances. This is the main advantage of the iterated Protocol 2 compared to Protocol 2 from [KT13] (not iterated).
Remark. But the SCCP for
Therefore, the attacker may conclude thats ′ is conjugated (by a conjugator b ∈ B N −p ) to an element in the (standard) parabolic subgroup
Using Nielsen-Thurston theory or some kind of subgroup distance attack this feature might be exploited by the attacker. We leave this as an open problem. 5.4. Challenges. As a challenge for a possible attacker, we provide some suggestions for the involved parameter values.
(1) Since the complexity of the involved braids might grow exponentially with the number l of internal nodes of the involved p.r.b. trees, an implementation of Protocol 2 in braid groups (as outlined in section 5.2) can only be efficient for small parameter values. Nevertheless, as a challenge, we suggest, for example, the following parameter values. We abandon simultaneity, i.e. we set m = n = 1. The braids s 1 , t 1 , a 1 , . . . , a k A , b 1 , . . . , b k B are generated as "random" signed words (over the standard generators σ i ) of length L = 15 in B N with N = 10. We choose p = 6 for the generalized shift and q = q 1 = q 2 = p/2 = 3. The braid A (2) A more efficient implementation in braid groups can be obtained by using the bi-LD-system (B ∞ , * , * ). As a challenge, we suggest, for example, the following parameter values. We abandon simultaneity, i.e. we set m = n = 1. The  braids s 1 , t 1 , a 1 , . . . , a k A , b 1 , . . . , b k B are generated as "random" signed words (over the standard generators σ i ) of length L = 25 in B N with N = 4. The iteration depths are set to k := k A = k B = 5, and we set the number l = l A = l B of internal nodes of the involved planar rooted binary trees to 5.
A disadvantage of this scheme is the following. Analogeously to Proposition 5.3 one may attack this scheme by solving 2 k instances of the subgroup CP for some standard parabolic subgroup in braid groups, namely the subgroup CP for B N −1 in B N for some N ∈ N.
(3) An extremely efficient implementation of Protocol 2 (as outlined in section 5.2) can be obtained by working in in the quotient system S ∞ rather than the partial multi-LD-system B ∞ . Here we may choose much larger parameter values as a challenge. We abandon simultaneity, i.e. we set m = n = 1. Analogeously to Proposition 5.3 one may attack Bob's secret by solving O(k) (k = k B ) instances of the SCCP for some standard parabolic subgroups in symmetric groups, namely the SCCP for
Note that here for an attack on Bob's key the solution O(k) (rather than 2 k ) SCCP-instance suffices. This is because under the surjection B ∞ → S ∞ , τ (p, ǫ) maps to the fixed permutation
for all ǫ ∈ {±1} k , and only k remains unknown.
6. Other instantiations 6.1. Instantiations using f -conjugacy. A straightforward computation yields the following proposition.
Proposition 6.1. Let G be a group and f 1 , f 2 ∈ End(G). Then (G, * f 1 , * f 2 ) with x * f i y = f i (x −1 y)x (for i = 1, 2) is a mutually left distributive system if and only if f 1 = f 2 .
Therefore, we don't have any nontrivial partial multi-LD-structures using fconjugacy. We only have the platform LD-system (G, * f ) for some fixed endomorphism f ∈ End(G) and we can only apply Protocol 1.
In Protocol 1 Bob's public key consist of elements s (for i = 1, . . . , m) . Evaluating the right hand side, we obtain
Since s 1 * f = {s 1 }, we cannot abandon simultaneity for f -conjugacy, i.e. we have m ≥ 2. Therefore, we have for 
where U denotes some upper bound on k B which might be obtained from the public keys or parameter specifications of the particular f -conjugacy KEP instantiation. Actually, it suffices to solve the latter U B m 2 -simultaneous CP-instances. If the center of G is "small", the attacker might obtain the original private keys k B andb. Similarly, he might approach Alice's private keys by solving (in parallel) U A n 2 -simultaneous CP-instances, where k A ≤ U A . Thus she might possibly obtain also k A andã = f k A −1 (a 1 ) · · · f (a k A −1 )a k A , and from these f k A (a 0 ). This suffices to recover the shared key
Therefore, it is recommended to choose the generators s i (and t j ) of S A (and S B ) such that the following sets have large centralizers
Since Alice cannot know k B (and Bob not k A ), this might be achieved by choosing the s i 's and t j 's such that the generator sets of S A and S B have already large centralizers.
Instantiation in finite matrix groups. Here we propose an efficient instantiation of the iterated f -conjugacy KEP in the finite matrix group G = GL(d, F p N ) where the f -conjugacy operation is given by the homomorphism f ∈ End(G) that is induced by the Frobenius ring endomorphism F r ∈ End(F p N ), defined by x → x p . Since ord(F r) = N induces ordf = N, the iteration depths k A , k B are bounded below n. Therefore, it is recommended to choose p small and N "large". As a challenge, we suggest, for example, the following parameter values. Set d = 6, p = 2, N = 40, m = n = 8, and the iteration depths are k A = k B = 25. We set the number l = l A = l B of internal nodes of the involved planar rooted binary trees to 10. Example 6.2. As a further example we propose a possible instantiation of the iterated f -conjugacy KEP in pure braid groups.
Recall that the N-strand braid group B N is generated by σ 1 , ..., σ N −1 where inside σ i the (i + 1)-th strand crosses over the i-th strand. There exists a natural epimorphism from B N onto the symmetric group S N , defined by σ i → (i, i + 1). Let G be the kernel of this epimorphism, namely the N-strand pure braid group P N . For some small integer d ≥ 1, consider the epimorphism η Alternatively, one may use the following modified scheme. Recall that P N is generated by the Remark 6.3. We leave it for future work to construct further instances of the iterated f -conjugacy KEP. The following proposition suggests that any platform LD-system (G, * f ) with G group and f ∈ End(G) satisfying f 2 = f .
Proposition 6.4. Consider the relation → * f induced by f -conjugacy, i.e. x → * f y if there exists a c ∈ G such that y = c * f x = f (c −1 x)c. The relation → * f is transitive if and only if f is a projector, i.e. f 2 = f .
Therefore, if f is a projector the iterated f -conjugacy KEP doesn't yield any advantage compared to its non-iterated version (see [KT13] ).
Furthermore, the following (iterated version of the) f -conjugator search problem should be hard.
Input: Element pairs (s 1 , s
6.2. Instantiations using f -symmetric conjugacy. A straightforward computation yields the following proposition.
Proposition 6.5. Let G be a group and f 1 , f 2 two projectors in End(G).
is a mutually left distributive system if and only if f 1 = f 2 .
Therefore, we don't have any nontrivial partial multi-LD-structures using fsymmetric conjugacy. We only have the platform LD-system (G, * f ) for some fixed projector f ∈ End(G) and we can only apply Protocol 1.
In Protocol 1 Bob's public key consist of elements s
. Evaluating the right hand side, we obtain
Consider the relation → * f induced by f -symmetric conjugacy, i.e. x → * f y if there exists a c ∈ G such that y = c * f x = f (cx −1 )c. The relation → * f is never transitive. Therefore, the iterated f -conjugacy KEP always provides an advantage compared to its non-iterated version (see [KT13] ).
We conclude the following m-simultaneous iterated f -symmetric conjugator search problem should be hard. Input: Element pairs (s 1 , s
for all i with 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Remark 6.6. As for f -conjugacy, since s 1 * f = {s 1 }, we cannot abandon simultaneity for f -symmetric conjugacy, i.e. we have m ≥ 2. Therefore, we have for F (t 1 , . . . , t N ) ), I ∈ {1, . . . , N} M and c ∈ F M q . Then f = f I,c ∈ End(G) is given by t I i → c i for all i = 1, . . . , M. Therefore, (G, * f ) is our platform LD-system with * f being f -symmetric conjugacy.
All generators s i and t j should be chosen such that their images under the evaluation homomorphism f are invertible, and they should have large centralizers.
The large centralizer condition might be satisfied, for example, using the following construction. For d = N, we consider images of pure braids under the Gassner representation P N −→ GL(d, F (t 1 , . . . , t N )) [Ga61] (where we reduce the involved integers modulo q). Images of (conjugates of) reducible (or "cabled") pure braids will certainly have "large" centralizers.
Unfortunately, since the coefficient ring F (t 1 , . . . , t N ) is infinite, the numerator and denominator polynomials start to grow quickly. Thus, G = GL (d, F (t 1 , . . . , t N ) ) is only for small parameter values an efficient platform group. Nevertheless, as a challenge, we suggest, for example, the following parameter values. Let d = 4, M = N = 1, and q = 37. For simplicity, we assume that q is prime. Furthermore, we set m = n = 6, and the iteration depths are k A = k B = 5. We set the number l = l A = l B of internal nodes of the involved planar rooted binary trees to 5. Recall that these trees are needed for the generation of a 0 , b 1 , . . . , b k B .
(2) The simultaneous iterated f -symmetric conjugator search problem appears to be hard even in finite groups. Here we propose a more efficient instantiation of the iterated f -symmetric conjugacy KEP in the finite matrix group G = GL(d, R) with coefficient ring R = F p [X]/(X N − 1) (N = p − 1) where the f -symmetric conjugacy operation is given by the homomorphism f ∈ End(G) that is induced by the evaluation homomorphism R −→ F p , defined by X → r for some fixed r ∈ F * p . This map is well defined since r p−1 − 1 = 0 for all r ∈ F * p according to Fermat's little theorem. Though the ring R has the same cardinality as F p p−1 , R is not a field since the polynomial X p−1 − 1 = r∈F * p (X − r) is not irreducible. For general N, R is also called the ring of N-truncated polynomials, and it is the platform ring of NTRUEncrypt [HPS98] .
As a challenge, we suggest, for example, the following parameter values. Set d = 4, p = 17, m = n = 8, and the iteration depths are k A = k B = 10. We set the number l = l A = l B of internal nodes of the involved planar rooted binary trees also to 10.
More generally, we could have chosen R = F q [X]/(g) as our coefficient ring, where g is a reducible polynomial (of degree N) over F q and q is some prime power. Then f ∈ End(G) is induced by some evaluation homomorphism on R which evaluates X on a root of g.
